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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is commonly accepted in growth literature that there is a strong con-
nection between natural resource endowments and economic growth results.
Evidence accumulated on historical examples and other ones taken from the
post-world-war II period are used to take positions on this matter. As was
early pointed out in Sachs and Warner (1995), countries with abundant nat-
ural resources tend to grow more slowly than countries poorly endowed in
terms of any of the usual natural resources. A negative relationship between
high natural resource intensity, namely a high value of resource-based ex-
ports to GDP, and the rate of growth appears as a robust empirical fact, with
many examples showing resource-poor economies that outperform resource-
rich economies in economic growth. In line with this result, Sachs and Warner
(2001) even speak about the curse of natural resources after having explored,
and refused statistically, the possibility of a spurious negative correlation
arising from the fact that natural resource sector could be the only surviving
sector in slow-growth countries.
There is, however, the traditional viewpoint according to which most of the
current rich economies once developed with the aid of their natural resources.
This argument seems to work as a counterexample only for periods, regions
and natural resources for which high transportation costs made proximity
decisive for physical availability. On the other hand, it is now well doc-
umented that such historical examples correspond to countries where the
natural resource intensity, measured as a percent of GDP, was much smaller
than the ratios observed in the examples corresponding to the second half of
the twentieth century.
Across the literature we may …nd multiple social, political and economic
factors explaining the adverse e¤ects of resource abundance on growth. Nev-
ertheless, the most accepted explanation of this focus on two elements: the
direct e¤ect known as Dutch disease (unfavorable exchange rate with high
price levels and wages, as well as dependance on primary exports); and the
indirect crowding-out e¤ect that ‡ows through human and social capital de-
terrence. Gylfason (2001a, 2001b) analyzes empirically these e¤ects and …nds
that in most countries that are rich in natural resources, the rates of growth
of per capita production over the long term have been lower than in other
countries that are less well endowed. Hence, economic growth varies inversely
with natural resource abundance. However, according to this author it has
2to be emphasized that the problem is not the existence of natural wealth as
such, but rather the failure of public authorities to avert the dangers that
accompany the gifts of nature. In any case, it is not inevitable that abundant
natural resources prevent the emergence of a dynamic economy or that the
discovery of such resources acts to dampen an already developed economy.
Natural resources can be a blessing or a curse as long as they bring risks:
abundant natural resources may imbue people with a false sense of security
and lead governments to lose sight of the need for good economic manage-
ment. Because of this, and given that countries without natural resources
have a smaller margin for error, they are more likely to be e¢ciently managed
in search of growth improvements. Auty (2001), in turn, considers two kind
of development models on the basis of the attributes and qualities of political
institutions: the competitive industrialization model that shows virtuous so-
cial and economic circles and applies to extreme resource-poor countries; and
the staple trap model, which specially applies to resource-abundant countries.
Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) propose an alternative explanation which con-
sists in that resource-rich countries grow more slowly because they are living
beyond their means. Hence, the corresponding adjustment for the level of
per capita income to its steady state is made from above displaying negative
rates of growth during the transition. These authors show that it can be
optimal for resource-rich countries to overshoot their long-run equilibrium
growth path.
Most of the literature concerning the relationship between natural resources
availability and economic growth refers to non-renewable resources in the
context of neoclassical exogenous growth models. In this paper, however,
we come up with a two-sector endogenous growth model where a single con-
sumption good is obtained using a renewable resource in combination with
physical capital. Both inputs are assumed to be essential for production
and, up to some degree, also technical substitutes. The renewable resource
has the capacity to grow in size over time, being able to supply increasing
productive inputs to the …nal good sector forever without bound. This capa-
bility, however, does not materialize automatically because it depends on the
endogenously decided rate of extraction as well as on the exogenous intrinsic
rate of growth. The latter results from demographic behavior of the natural
resource stock and collective ecologically-based interventions. Therefore, we
…nd in this point a …rst opportunity for public intervention through active
ecological policies. Governmental organizations coordinated at di¤erent lev-
3els, mainly regional and local, can play a major role undertaking ecological
and environmental actions that, while a¤ecting the intrinsic rate of growth
of natural resources, expand the margins for sustainability and economic
growth.
Moreover, we assume that there is a private property rights system properly
de…ned over the natural resource. Particularly, we assume that the stock of
natural capital is equally and uniformly owned by consumers. Accordingly,
…rms have not open access to the stock because they have to pay the im-
plicit unit price corresponding to the amount of harvested resource. On one
hand, this allows us to avoid the problem of ine¢cient over-exploitation that
usually appears in the context of commonly owned resources or in absence
of property rights at all. On the other hand, we …nd here another oppor-
tunity for public interventions because governmental organizations, mainly
national and international, have an important role to play by establishing a
well-functioning legal system that enhances private property rights or well-
managed common ownership.
In addition, we introduce a production externality in the …nal good sector
associated with the natural resource. Although it is not fundamental for the
results in our model, it enlarges the framework for discussion, and opens the
possibility for multiple equilibrium paths in connection with the existence, at
the aggregate level, of increasing returns to scale over accumulable factors.
The presence of an externality in this model makes necessary to distinguish
between the competitive equilibrium solution and the socially optimal solu-
tion. This allows again for a major role that government can play by means
of a direct regulation. Optimal taxes and subsidies can be designed to create
appropriate incentives for private behavior to eliminate the wedge between
decentralized and social planner solutions.
Finally, we would like to point out, as Gylfason et al. (1999) did, that
natural resource endowments may be a mixed blessing. Most people con-
sider its abundance as a misfortune, but this is not necessarily so because
after all positive, higher or lower, growth is in large measure a matter of
choice, an endogenously determined outcome. What is important for eco-
nomic growth is not the abundance of natural resources per se, but rather
the e¢ciency of their management. Experience shows that abundant natural
wealth, if not well managed, reduces economic growth in the long-run. It
does provide nations with short term increased wealth but in the long term
this may slow economic growth. For example, inasmuch as natural resource
4abundance involves free access to scarce common-property resources by pri-
vate agents, leaving the resource rent up for grabs, ine¢cient harvesting and
over-exploitation will necessarily appear. In this context, we will inquiry
whether e¢ciency, long-run growth and sustainability are both compatible
in a natural resource based production economy. In short, we are going
to study the issues of sustainability, long-run and short-run growth as well
as convergence, which appear associated with the competitive equilibrium
solution trajectories.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the model econ-
omy (preferences, technology and the characteristics of the natural renewable
resource used in the production process); in Section 3 we solve the intertem-
poral optimization problem for a competitive economy, and provide the dy-
namic system which governs the state of the economy over time1;i nS e c t i o n
4 we present some Propositions collecting the main competitive equilibrium
results for the relevant variables; in Section 5 we study economic features
associated with equilibrium trajectories, particularly the properties of sus-
tainability, growth and convergence; and …nally, in Section 6 we conclude.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a closed and competitive economy which is populated by many
identical and in…nitely lived agents. Population, which we assume constant,
is denoted by N. Individual preferences are assumed to be represented by an
instantaneous utility function U (:), which is twice continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly concave in its argument c(t), the real per capita
consumption of an aggregate single good at date t. In particular, we assume
the following functional form that implies a constant intertemporal elasticity





In this economy there is a renewable natural resource2, which is an essential
1The complete closed-form solution to this dynamic system is supplied in Aznar-
Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002).
2According to the general de…nition given in Stiglitz (1980), we speak of a commodity
or factor which is provided by nature and not produced, or producible, by man. Moreover,
it is renewable in the sense of a stock that can be maintained, provided it is not consumed
5input for production and that is treated as a private good: it shares the
properties of rivalry and excludability with the remaining inputs. The stock
of this natural capital at date t is denoted by Q(t). We assume that such
a stock is composed of homogeneous units and that it changes over time
because of two di¤erent ‡ows that have opposite and o¤setting e¤ects on the
stock. First, in the absence of any human economically-based intervention,
the natural resource evolves according to a biotic law of motion that suggests
an exponential growth at a constant rate ±>0. This implies that our
natural resource is not subject to the traditional biological laws that apply
to animal species, commonly represented by the logistic equation, or that
we abstract from the negative feedbacks associated with overcrowding and
environmental resistance.3 Beyond such phenomena, the intrinsic constant
growth rate ± still may be considered as the net result of di¤erent exogenous
natural processes: births, deaths and human ecologically-based interventions.
Second, the stock of natural capital is subject to an economically motivated
extraction process, or harvesting activity, because it is necessarily required
for production of the …nal good in our economy. We de…ne z (t) as the ag-
gregate extraction rate, with z (t) 2 [0;1], and assume that there are many
individual …rms, each of them extracting a percentage zi(t) from the aggre-
gate stock. If we consider every …rm as being identical to each other, and
assume that there are exactly the same number of …rms than population, we
get: z(t)=
PN
i=1 zi(t)=Nzi(t). Finally, we assume a linear harvesting func-
tion according to which the renewable resource diminishes, each period, by
the amount z (t)Q(t). In short, we assume that resources used for harvesting
are homogeneous, all the harvesters have the same objective function and the
marginal product to e¤ort is equal to the average one. Moreover, although
the model considers free entry and costless harvesting4, there is no free dis-
posal or open access to the natural capital stock because the individual …rm
has to pay for the use of the natural resource.
As we have just seen, the extraction rate is an endogenous variable, and the
too rapidly, or because its supply can be increased after utilization.
3It may be useful to see Peterson and Fisher (1977), as well as Shone (1997) and Perman
et al. (1999), for an integrated study of all these biological and economic concepts from
an analytical point of view.
4As Stiglitz (1980) points out, natural resouces require human activity to convert them
into a useful form and indeed to extract them, but for simplicity we assume here that
extraction costs are negligible.
6way the economy decides the value of z (t) h a sd i r e c te ¤ e c t so nt h eo p p o r -
tunity set for present and future consumption. If the resource is harvested
for too long at a rate exceeding its regeneration capabilities, the stock of
natural capital will decrease over time. Consequently, the higher the cur-
rent extraction rate the higher production and consumption today, but the
smaller production and consumption in the near future. Connected with the
previous statements, it must be recalled that even though the natural capital
is a renewable resource, this does not mean that it should be inexhaustible.
In fact, there is a crucial di¤erence between physical and natural capital:
while the …rst one may be used repeatedly without any consequence on its
available quantity because only depreciation can reduce it, the second one
disappears automatically from the stock as it is used for production. Now,
combining the two ‡ows that a¤ect the evolution of this natural capital stock,
we obtain the following law of motion:5
²
Q (t)=± (1 ¡ z(t))Q(t) ¡ z (t)Q(t) (2)
In the …nal single-good sector, production is ensured by many identical com-
petitive …rms. Technology at the …rm level is represented by a production
function F (:), which is twice continuously di¤erentiable in each of its argu-
ments, strictly increasing and strictly concave in the private inputs, and sat-
is…es the Inada conditions. Aggregate production, Y (t), depends positively
on the stock of homogeneous physical capital, K(t), on the amount of natural
resource that is harvested, destroyed or transformed each period, z (t)Q(t),
as well as on the aggregate stock of natural capital, Qa(t). The latter plays
the role of an external e¤ect in the production process because though all
…rms bene…t from it, no individual harvesting decision can have a signi…cant
e¤ect on the aggregate stock. Consequently, we will di¤erentiate notation
by adding the subscript a to emphasize the distinction between internal and
external e¤ects. This externality a¤ects productivity of all private factors of
production and may be interpreted as the positive e¤ect that the size of the
natural stock exerts on the ‡ow of produced goods, simply by augmenting
total factor productivity or under the form of a lower implicit cost and a
5This expression may be encompassed in a more general law of motion for animal
species that are subject to human harvesting:
²






¡ zQ.O u r
equation, then, comes immediately under the particular assumption of no saturation level
or an in…nite carrying capacity Sc, the maximum stock that the habitat can support.
7greater implicit quality associated with the harvested natural resource.6 The





This equation implies that production for each …rm exhibits constant re-
turns to scale over private internal factors. Moreover, for …xed Qa,t h e r e
are diminishing returns to K and Q.I f , h o w e v e r , Qa rises along with K
diminishing returns will not arise because of the increasing returns to scale
with respect to all the accumulable factors taken together. That is, there
are increasing returns to scale at the aggregate and social levels. Note that
the form of the production function implies that an increase in Qa raises the
marginal products of both physical and natural capital, and the absence of
diminishing returns to the factors that can be accumulated is at the origin
of the endogenous growth result.8 On the other hand, in this equation the
e¢ciency parameter A roughly represents the constant technological level in
the …nal good sector, parameter ¯ is the elasticity of output with respect to
physical capital, and parameter ° is a positive constant capturing the weight
of the external e¤ects of natural capital.
Total output, Y (t), may be allocated to either aggregate consumption or
physical capital accumulation.9 Consumption contributes directly to cur-
rent welfare while investment, which increases current physical capital stock,
allows for a greater future consumption and welfare. For the sake of simplic-
ity, it is assumed that there is no physical capital depreciation. Hence, the
current aggregate resources constraint may be written as:
6For example, in the case of the forest resource and wooded land a lower stock might
imply either more time and a greater distance to …nd wood of a certain quality, which
must be considered as a higher implicit price, or a lower quality of the harvested wood for
a given price.
7We abstract from labor as an explicit factor of production because it is assumed
inelastically supplied. Each agent is endowed with a …xed quantity of work e¤ort, which
we normalize to one. Consequently, it may be considered implicitly included in the constant
term of the production function.
8Under these assumptions, individual …rms still face to a concave optimization prob-
lem, but the external e¤ect introduces a distortion between private and social marginal
productivity of natural capital.
9As previously set, we do not consider in this model explicit extraction costs, which






° ¡ Nc(t) (4)
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
The problem facing up this economy, for a given constant intertemporal dis-
count rate ½>0 that represents the time preference or the agents impatience









subject to (2) and (4), for K(0) = K0 > 0 and Q(0) = Q0 > 0 given.
Because of the presence of a technological externality, our economy does not
ful…l the required assumptions for the basic welfare theorems to be satis…ed.
Consequently, the competitive solution to this problem does not correspond
to a social optimum. Namely, the intertemporal growth paths are not optimal
growth paths in the sense of Pareto. In this paper we focus on the study of the
competitive equilibrium and its outcomes, which is still compatible with the
presence of increasing returns to scale because of the non-increasing private
returns to both capitals. Therefore, the representative optimizing agent takes
Qa(t) as given when he has to decide the variables under his direct control.
In order to calculate the competitive sub-optimal equilibrium, we will impose
hereafter an additional condition to make individual decisions compatible at
the aggregate level. From now on, we will consider the constant population
N normalized to one and remove the time subscripts from the variables.
The current value Hamiltonian associated with the previous intertemporal
optimization problem may be written as:
H












+ µ2 [(± ¡ (1 + ±)z)Q] (5)
9where µ1 and µ2 are the co-state variables (shadow prices) associated with K
and Q, respectively. Then, the set of equations arising from the Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle as …rst order necessary conditions, under the equilibrium
condition Qa = Q,a r e : 10
c
¡¾ = µ1 (6)
µ1 (1 ¡ ¯)AK
¯z
¡¯Q
1¡¯+° = µ2 (1 + ±)Q (7)
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The boundary conditions include the initial conditions K0 and Q0,a n dt h e
transversality conditions:
10These equations correspond to the competitive solution of the decentralized optimiza-
tion problem where each competitive …rm faces the following stationary problem in the
absence of extraction costs and depreciation charges: Max
fKi;zig
¼i = F(Ki;z iQ;Qa)¡rKi ¡
qziQ, and the consumers side solves the intertemporal optimization problem (P) but tak-
ing into account the dynamic constraint
²
K= rK + qzQ +¦¡ Nc i n s t e a do f( 4 ) . W i t h
price q we signify that the natural resource is scarce, consequently explicit extraction costs
are not needed to have a well-de…ned problem. The rental prices for both types of capital
services in the second problem satisfy the necessary conditions from the former:










Given the assumption of constant returns to scale at the private level, output exactly
exhausts by paying the inputs according to their marginal productivities. Hence, aggregate
economic rents ¦ become zero.
10lim
t!1




Equation (6) shows that on the margin, …nal good must be equally valuable
in its two uses: consumption and physical capital accumulation. Namely, the
marginal utility of consumption must be equal to the marginal value (implicit
price) of physical capital. Equation (7) shows in turn that, at equilibrium,
the value of the marginal productivity of natural resource (in case of being
harvested) must be equal to the value of its marginal contribution to natural
capital accumulation (in case of being saved). The Euler equation (8) states
that the marginal productivity of physical capital (the bene…t of delaying
consumption) equals its rental price, which in the absence of depreciation is
given by the di¤erence between the discount rate and the rate of physical
capital gains or losses, ½ ¡
²
µ1
µ1. The Euler equation (9), in turn, gives the
intertemporal e¢ciency condition that must be satis…ed in the process of
natural capital allocation. The value, in terms of natural capital, of the
marginal productivity of Q in the …nal good sector must be equal to its
opportunity cost: the di¤erence between the discount rate and the rate of
change of the aggregate shadow value of the natural capital stock. This is a
modi…ed version of the Hotelling rule, which imposes intertemporal e¢ciency
to the resource extraction activities. In our particular case, after substituting
the static e¢ciency condition (7) into (9), we …nd that dynamic e¢ciency
requires the intrinsic exogenous rate of growth of natural resource (the bene…t
of waiting) to be equal to the di¤erence between the discount rate and the
rate of capital gains or losses associated with natural capital (the opportunity




11Arising from the decentralized problem, under the equilibrium conditions we …nd that
competitive rental prices may be written as:

















(1 + ±) (iv)


















After substituting the above expressions in (8)-(11), we obtain the following
dynamic system:
²












































where K and Q represent either the aggregate as well as the per capita levels









These equations, together with the initial conditions K0 and Q0,a n dt h e
transversality conditions (12) and (13), make the equilibrium dynamics of
our economic system completely determined over time.
4 Competitive equilibrium results
The complete closed-form solution for the variables appearing in the dynamic
system (16)-(19), as well as for the controls of the model, may be found in
Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002) together with a detailed proof of
each result. This dynamic system, which mirrors the structure of the Lu-
cas (1988) two-sector endogenous growth model, has been solved under the
These two prices share the usual structure for rental prices, adapted for the particular
assumptions made in this model where the physical capital depreciation rate is zero, the
‡ow of harvested natural capital authomatically implies a withdraw from the stock and
prices are measured in terms of consumption good.
12assumption that the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
equals the physical capital share, ¾ = ¯. In a recent paper, Ruiz-Tamarit
(2002) shows that the dynamic characterization of the solution must be dif-
ferentiated according to the parameter subspace in which we undertake the
study of the system. There are two disjoint sets of parameter values for which
it does exist at least one solution trajectory under competitive conditions.
The …rst one always implies a multiplicity of solutions and, hence, indetermi-
nacy. It refers to the case of multiple solution trajectories starting from the
same initial conditions for predetermined variables, all of them converging to
a unique steady state or balanced growth path. Nevertheless, as it is shown
there, this case is very implausible because of its counterintuitive predic-
tions. For example, the long-run rate of growth emerges as positively related
to the discount rate, while the rate of extraction from the natural resource
stock shows a negative dependence on this parameter. Consequently, in this
paper we concentrate on the parameter subspace where the results ensure
the existence of a unique solution trajectory for every variable. Namely, the
case where the externality is not too strong. Now, in this section we will
collect the main results for the variables: natural capital stock, extraction
rate, output, relative shadow prices and the ratio between the two capital
stocks.
Proposition 1 : Under the equilibrium conditions, if °<¯and ±(1 + ° ¡ ¯)¡
½<0 then:
(i) there exist a unique and positive equilibrium path for the renewable
natural capital stock Q,s t a r t i n gf r o mQ0:







(ii) there are no transitional dynamics for Q, which grows permanently





depending on whether ± ? ½.
In the complementary parameter subspace it does not exist any equilibrium
path for Q or there are a continuum of such equilibrium paths starting from
Q0.
Proof : See Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002).
13Proposition 2 : Under the equilibrium conditions, if °<¯and ±(1 + ° ¡ ¯)¡
½<0 then:
(i) there exist a unique equilibrium path for the extraction or harvesting
rate z;
(ii) this equilibrium path, along which there are no transitional dynamics,





w h i c ha l s or e p r e s e n t st h eu n i q u eb a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t h ;
(iii) the extraction rate satis…es the constraint 1 >
¡
z> 0 if and only if
±>½+ ° ¡ ¯.
In the complementary parameter subspace it does not exist any equilibrium
path for z or there are a continuum of such equilibrium paths.
Proof : See Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002).






±(1 + ° ¡ ¯) ¡ ½<0 then:
(i) there exist a unique and positive equilibrium path for the physical cap-





























±¯(1 + ° ¡ ¯) ¡ °½
exp
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(ii) this equilibrium path evolves describing transitional dynamics, and
approaches asymptotically to the unique positive balanced growth path where


































In the complementary parameter subspace it does not exist any equilibrium
path for K or there are a continuum of such equilibrium paths starting from
K0.
14Proof : See Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002).
Proposition 4 : Under the equilibrium conditions c =
½
¯K, 8t ¸ 0.
Proof : See Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002).
From the previous Propositions, it is easy to deduce the following one which
summarizes in terms of the aggregate level of output, or the equivalent per
capita level, the growth results in our economy.






±(1 + ° ¡ ¯) ¡ ½<0 then:
(i) there exist a unique and positive equilibrium path for the per capita
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(ii) this equilibrium path shows transitional dynamics, and approaches as-
ymptotically to an exponential monotonic path along which production grows










pending on whether ± ? ½. This one constitutes the unique positive balanced


































In the complementary parameter subspace it does not exist any equilibrium
path for Y or there are a continuum of such equilibrium paths starting from
Y0.
15The next Proposition gives some additional results arising from the model,
w h i c hc o n c e r nt h er e l a t i v es h a d o wp r i c e sa n dt h er a t i ob e t w e e nt h et w o
capital stocks.






±(1 + ° ¡ ¯) ¡ ½<0 then:
(i) there exist a unique and positive equilibrium path for the relative price
µ1
µ2 and a unique and positive equilibrium path for the ratio K
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(ii) under the additional condition: ±¯ > °½, these equilibrium paths
move asymptotically, describing transitional dynamics, towards their respec-
tive unique and positive balanced paths. Along the balanced path, relative
price monotonically approaches to zero or grows exponentially to in…nity at
a constant rate, depending on whether ± ? ½. On the contrary, along its bal-
anced path, the ratio between capitals grows exponentially at a constant rate





























































(iii) in the particular case where no externality does exist, ° =0 ,t h e
relative price
µ1
µ2 follows a unique and positive equilibrium path approaching








(1+±)1¡¯ , and the ratio
K
Q follows a unique and positive equilibrium path approaching monotonically











In the complementary parameter subspace it does not exist any equilibrium
path for µ1
µ2 and K
Q or there are a continuum of such equilibrium paths for each
one.
The proof of this Proposition is easy from the previous results on Q and K,a s
well as from the results in Aznar-Márquez and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002) relative
to µ1 and µ2. In short, we have that when capital stocks increase (decrease),
with K increasing (decreasing) more rapidly than Q, their shadow prices
decrease (increase), with µ1 going down (up) faster than µ2.
5 Growth, Convergence and Sustainability
In this section we interpret the previous analytical results stressing on the
properties of the model in terms of long-run sustainability and growth as well
as short-run growth and convergence. First, from Proposition 1 we have that
¡
gQ is positive when ±>½ . In such a case, using the equilibrium value of the
harvesting rate
¡
z provided by Proposition 2, the result of permanent positive
growth for Q appears associated with a harvesting rate lower than zS = ±
1+±.12






gY. In the alternative case where ±<½ , all the previous results are
reversed and they come associated with a harvesting rate greater than zS.
In short, long-run positive growth is sustainable as long as
¡
z<z S.G i v e n
that zS is an increasing function of the intrinsic growth rate of the natural
12The value zS represents the harvesting rate for which the stock of natural capital (a
renewable natural resource in this model) remains constant over time.
17capital, ±, several exogenous factors a¤ecting birth and death rates as well as
o¤-the-model human ecologically-based interventions may have an important
positive impact on the margins for sustainable long-run endogenous positive
growth. Usually, by sustainability it is meant a state with a sustained long-
run level of per capita consumption in which the natural capital stock, or
its ‡ow of resource services, is non-declining through time. In this paper
we go further supplying conditions for a sustained long-run positive rate of
growth of per capita consumption. Our results show that it is possible to
have simultaneously economic growth and sustainability and, moreover, how
are they compatible with e¢cient behavior in both senses: intra and inter-
temporally.
Second, the long-run value of the rate of growth associated with physical
capital, consumption and (per capita) production,
¡
g, depends positively on
the e¢ciency parameter ±, which represents the biotic rate of growth of
natural capital, but negatively on the rate of discount, ½.T h e s et w or e l a t i o n s
hold irrespective to the sign of growth: positive when ±>½and negative
when ±<½ . On other hand, this rate of growth depends positively on the
parameter associated with the technological externality, °, when the economy
experiences positive growth, ±>½ , but it changes to the opposite when there
is negative growth, ±<½ . Finally, because of the presence of the externality,
the e¤ect of the physical capital share in goods sector, ¯, over the long-run
rate of growth is ambiguous. However, as long as the value of ° is small
enough, we can expect a negative e¤ect when ±>½and a positive one when
±<½ . The long-run, as well as the short-run, rate of growth of natural
capital stock,
¡
gQ, depends positively on the parameter ± and negatively on
½, regardless of the sign of growth. This rate, instead, depends negatively on
¯ and positively on ° when the economy experiences positive growth, but it
changes to the opposite when there is negative growth.
Moreover, looking at the long-run as well as the short-run equilibrium har-
vesting rate
¡
z, we can see that it depends negatively on the intrinsic growth
rate of the natural capital, ±, and positively on the rate of discount, ½,i r -
respectively to what happens in terms of growth. However, the harvesting
rate increases with ¯ and decreases with ° only when the rate of growth in
the economy is positive, because these e¤ects are reversed when the rate of
growth is negative.
Consequently, an increase in ± that expands the margins for sustainability
18because increases zS and reduces
¡
z, has an additional positive e¤ect increas-




gY. On the other
hand, a more patient society chooses a lower harvesting rate and reaches a
greater long-run rate of growth. The same is true for an economy with a
stronger externality and a lower physical capital share, as long as such econ-
omy experiences positive growth. Overall these questions we have that in a
more patient society, positive long-run growth is compatible with lower biotic
rates of growth of its natural capital, while in less patient societies long-run
positive growth is only possible under higher values for ±.
In the short-run, however, from (20) the rate of growth of per capita produc-
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Moreover, from Propositions 3 and 4, the rate of growth of physical capital
stock, which is equal to the rate of growth of per capita consumption, may
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Now, it is easy to see that the previous rates of growth for Y , c and K



































0 . Hence, we may conclude that transitional rates of growth converge,
from above or below, to their long-run values. This convergence is a direct
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The previous result holds in both situations: positive long-run rates of growth
when ±>½ , and negative long-run rates of growth when ±<½ . In the former,
convergence from above occurs for short-run rates of growth always positive,
but convergence from below may be found even for initially negative short-
run rates of growth crossing the zero axis in …nite time. In the second one,
convergence from below occurs for short-run rates of growth always negative,
but convergence from above may be found even for initially positive short-run
rates of growth crossing the zero axis in …nite time.
Coming back to the levels of the variables, and according to the Propositions
provided in the previous section, we may conclude that in the short-run tra-
jectories for K, c and Y show transitional dynamics as well as convergence
to their long-run levels and rates of growth. The trajectory for the shadow
price of physical capital stock, µ1, also shows transitional dynamics and con-
vergence in its level and rate of growth. Moreover, we …nd that price and
quantity evolve in opposite directions. On the other hand, we prove that
there are no transitional dynamics for Q and z.T h i si sa l s ot r u ef o rµ2,t h e
shadow price of natural capital stock, which along the unique equilibrium
trajectory evolves exponentially at a constant rate. In this case price and
quantity move in opposite directions too. As a consequence of the previous
statements, the trajectories for relative prices and the ratio between capital
stocks experience transitional dynamics and convergence in both their levels
and rates of growth.
It has to be remarked that, although the long-run trajectory for Q depends
on the initial condition Q0, the long-run trajectories for K and Y do not de-
pend on the initial condition K0, but only on the initial condition Q0.T h i s
means that what matters for the long-run levels of (per capita) production is
20not the initial endowment of physical capital but the endowment of natural
capital.13 The best way to see this is by taking two similar countries A and
B, and allowing di¤erences among them only in their initial endowments of
physical and natural capital. It is beyond question that they will converge
to the same rate of growth unless some fundamental di¤erence a¤ects their
technological or preference parameters. However, during the transition their
growth rates may di¤er due to di¤erences in the levels of both natural and
physical capital stocks. According to (26), the current rate of growth of (per
capita) production depends positively on the distance between the current
level and the level associated with the balanced growth path of the ratio be-
tween physical and natural capital stocks. But things are di¤erent in terms of
the levels of output (per capita), since there could be overtaking, divergence
without overtaking or convergence, depending on the initial conditions.14
First, consider a resource-poor country A relative to another resource-rich
country B, QA
0 <Q B
0 , but the former being endowed with a bigger initial
physical capital stock, KA
0 >K B
0 . Then, as long as the initial current pro-
duction in country A is still bigger than in country B, Y A(0) >YB(0),t h i s
one will overtake country A in a …nite time period given that in the long-run




. Here, overtaking appears as absolutely dependent
on the initial endowments of natural capital across countries and does not
depend on the rate of extraction that they choose during the transition. Con-
sequently, the resource-rich country will always emerge in …nite time as the
richest country. Second, pure divergence without overtaking also appears in
this model when we observe a relatively resource-rich country A, QA
0 >Q B
0 ,
endowed with a higher initial physical capital stock, KA
0 = KB
0 . I ns u c ha




in the long-run. Third,
we can still observe convergence in levels for any initial distribution of phys-
ical capital stocks, KA
0 ? KB
0 , if we have two equal resource-rich countries,
QA
0 = QB
0 . I ns u c hac a s e ,a l t h o u g hY A(0) ? Y B(0),w ew i l lo b s e r v et h a t




always holds. In short, these cases show how much
13This particular result arises from the fact that we have assumed the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be equal to the physical capital share. However,
although in a more general framework the model will not display exactly the same kind
of results, this one may still be considered as an orientative case for the study of more
realistic and complex growth processes.
14This is true only for the case where variables experience positive growth because in
t h eo p p o s i t ec a s e ,w h e r e±<½ , the only feasible result is convergence, but convergence to
zero.
21relevant is natural capital over physical capital, in determining the pattern
of growth followed by di¤erent countries over time.
Next, we will provide some analytical expressions to easily handle the results
on convergence studied along the previous paragraphs. First, taking the
de…nition of speed of convergence and using (20), (21), (23) and (25), we
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This equation gives the speed of convergence of the current production level
to the long-run production level. The speed of convergence approaches, from




(¯¡°)¯ > 0, depend-






S 1. The long-run value of the speed of convergence
depends positively on the natural resource intrinsic growth rate, ±, and neg-
atively on the intertemporal rate of discount, ½. Moreover, it depends pos-
itively on the parameter associated with technological externality, °,w h e n
±>½but negatively when ±<½ . The e¤ect of the elasticity of output with
respect to physical capital, ¯, remains ambiguous due to the presence of the
externality.
In general, to the extent that in the context of our model as countries develop
their current K
Q values, and hence also their levels of per capita production,
approach the long-run ones from below, then (29) shows that the speed of
convergence decreases during the transition. Furthermore, as long as sus-
tainability is ensured, the rates of growth during the transition are always
positive. The picture that Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) describe in terms of
short-run evolution for per capita production has nothing to do with ours.
They …nd for a developing country that convergence to the steady state lev-
els occurs from above and, associated with the nature of their model, also
predict negative rates of growth during the transition. According to these
authors, natural capital abundance allows an economy to a¤ord extraordi-
nary consumption possibilities and, hence, on the transition to the steady
state it grows more slowly precisely because they have an unsustainable high
level of income. Nevertheless, the process of convergence in our model is
22monotonic and, consequently, it does not produce anything comparable to
their mechanism of overshooting.
Finally, from the de…nition of saving rate that corresponds to this model
economy, and using expressions for K, c and Y as well as (23) and (25), we
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Under the condition which guarantees positive economic growth and sustain-
ability: ±>½ , the saving rate converges, from above or below, to its unique











S 1. This long-run saving rate depends positively on ±,a sw e l la s
on the size of the externality parameter, °. Moreover, it depends negatively
on the discount rate, ½, but the sign of the e¤ect associated with ¯,t h e
aggregate physical capital share, is ambiguous. This sign will be positive or
negative depending on whether ¯ ?
1+°
2 , if and only if ° 6=0 .O t h e r w i s e ,
this latter parameter would not have any in‡uence on the asymptotic saving
rate.
The result given in (30) allows us to connect with the well-known Hartwick’s
Rule that has been largely studied in the context of neoclassical growth mod-
els when a non-renewable natural resource, which is subject to depletion, is
included. This is a savings rule that concerns the rate at which physical capi-
tal must be accumulated if we want to compensate for the diminishing natural
resource.15 The Hartwick rule ensures that an aggregate measure of capital
is being maintained at a constant level, but also imposes strong conditions
like e¢cient extraction and substitutability between natural and physical
capital. Then, by following this rule we increase the feasibility of having a
sustained level of per capita consumption in the future. Notwithstanding,
what we have found in our model is a general savings rule, which determines
the amount of physical capital that has to be accumulated in order to justify
15Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) suggest that an economy has to invest its temporary
resource windfalls in international assets that pay permanent annuities, and consume the
interest it earns on such assets.
23a positive long-run rate of growth of per capita consumption. Furthermore,
this rule is obtained along with conditions that ensure an increasing stock of
natural capital as well as an e¢cient harvesting programme.16
In a recent paper, Gylfason and Zoega (2001) analyze from a theoretical
point of view the in‡uence of natural resource abundance on the saving rate,
the rate of growth and the speed of convergence. They carry out the above
study using both a neoclassical growth model as well as an endogenous growth
model àl aRomer, expanded to include natural resources. In the context of
the former, authors show that the share of natural capital in national income
has a negative impact on the saving rate as well as on the long-run level of
output per capita, but a positive one on the speed of convergence. In the
context of the second model, they show that either the saving rate as well as
the long-run rate of growth depend negatively on the natural capital share.
For now, in a two-sector endogenous growth model, our results show that
the long-run value of the saving rate does not depend on the share of natural
capital in national income, 1¡¯, if we make comparable the models assuming
° =0 . We also con…rm their result concerning the speed of convergence but,
contrary to them, we …nd that the long-run rate of growth depends positively
on the natural capital share.
6 Conclusions
Our results show that it is possible to have simultaneously economic growth
and sustainability, compatible with e¢cient behavior in both senses: intra
and inter-temporally. In economies with impatient agents, however, positive
long-run growth is only possible if their natural resource experiences a high
biotic rate of growth. In the short-run production and consumption show
transitional dynamics as well as convergence to their long-run levels and
16Actually, our model admits both a positive as well as a negative long-run rate of
growth, which is determined by the relationship between the e¢cient harvesting rate,
¡
z, and the critical value zS. That is to say, the relationship between ± and ½.S o ,
given a low harvesting rate that implies an increasing stock of natural capital, the only
opportunity for balanced long-run positive growth comes from a simultaneous increase of
the physical capital stock. A positive saving rate, and the corresponding rate of physical
capital accumulation, is required to ensure such a result. In the alternative case where a
high harvesting rate determines a decreasing stock of natural capital, our model allows for
a negative saving rate that implies a decreasing stock of physical capital.
24rates of growth. In general, any increase in the intrinsic rate of growth
of the natural resource expands the margins for sustainability and has an
additional positive e¤ect on the long-run rate of growth. Moreover, a more
patient society chooses a lower harvesting rate and reaches a greater long-
run rate of growth. In short, it has to be noted the prominent importance of
natural capital for growth. In the particular case of no externality a¤ecting
production in the …nal goods sector, our model predicts that the saving
rate does not depend on the natural capital share, but the long-run rate of
growth and the speed of convergence depend positively, while the extraction
rate depends negatively. Thus, in the context of our model, we can explain
most of the empirical facts described in Gylfason and Zoega (2001) and
Gylfason (2001a, 2001b). If we consider two di¤erently endowed economies,
they will converge in rates of growth whenever they have identical parameters
associated with production and utility functions. But things are di¤erent in
terms of the levels of the variables, since there could be overtaking, divergence
without overtaking or convergence, depending on the initial conditions.
All the previous results have been obtained under the simplifying assump-
tion that the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals the
physical capital share. Nevertheless, given that we are interested in theo-
retical properties of the transitional dynamics and the closed form solution
for the di¤erent variables, the above assumption does not seem too restric-
tive. In fact, we can identify three main shortcomings associated with this
procedure: consumption is proportional to physical capital stock, the initial
physical capital stock does not appear determining any of the long-run bal-
anced growth paths, and transitional dynamics for the variables in the model
are partially simpli…ed. Consequently, our model may be considered as an
orientative theory for the study of growth processes in economies where pro-
duction is obtained using a renewable natural resource in combination with
other factors.
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